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1. Introduction
Studies about companies’ compliance with international accounting standards have been
growing alongside the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) in the European Union (EU) since 2005 and in Asian countries since 2011/2012.
The studies use various theoretical perspectives and methodologies in attempts to explain the
extent of companies’ compliance with required standards and the factors affecting such
compliance. Following this prior research, the present study examines the degree of
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the IFRS-based Pernyataan Standar
Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) financial accounting standards among listed companies of the
Indonesian Stock Exchange for the year ending 2012, and seeks to determine the underlying
factors that affect the level of disclosure.
A number of studies have investigated the level of companies’ compliance with IFRS
disclosures and the factors affecting such compliance, both in developed countries (Cooke
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1989, Yeoh 2005, Iatridis 2008) and developing countries (Owusu-Ansah 1998, Akhtaruddin
2005, Abdelsalam and Weetman 2007, Aljifri 2008, Al-Shammari et al. 2008, Hossain and
Hammami 2009, Al-Mutawaa and Hewaidy 2010, Tsalavoutas 2011, Abdullah and Minhat
2013). The findings were mixed. While most studies conducted in developed markets
showed a high degree of compliance, studies conducted in emerging countries showed
otherwise. It is supposed that weak enforcement in developing countries has encouraged non
-compliance. Nevertheless, most studies agreed that the release of information is useful to
investors when making decisions (Cooke 1989), mitigates conflict between principals and
agents, enhances the value of companies (Lobo and Zhou 2001), and reduces financial and
auditing costs for listed companies (Levich 2001, Mayhew et al. 2001, Spathis 2002).
A few studies have examined the level of companies’ compliance with accounting
standards in Indonesia. Craig and Diga (1998) analyzed corporate annual report disclosure
practices in five ASEAN countries, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines, using sample data of 145 public companies listed on ASEAN stock exchanges.
Among these countries, the level of companies’ compliance in Indonesia was the lowest.
Setyadi et al. (2009) reviewed the same issue by using a single data set of Indonesian
companies and found that the extent to which listed companies complied with accounting
standards was low. Both sets of research used sample data from financial reports before
referring to accounting standards that were IFRS convergent and noted that weak
enforcement was the reason for non-compliance.
The present study aims to rectify the gaps in prior studies by employing sample data for
which national accounting standards were fully IFRS/International Accounting Standards
(IAS) 2009 convergent. It also expands the empirical literature about accounting compliance
in Indonesia and thereby benefits Indonesia’s financial markets. Moreover, the study aims to
analyze the impact of IFRS-based PSAK implementation to establish whether it benefits the
program of the Indonesian Institute of Accountants. Accounting compliance is a critical
issue for Indonesian capital markets because it encourages confidence, protects stakeholders,
and contributes to the national economy by encouraging conformity with rules set by the
Bapepam-LK1 (the Capital Market Supervisory Agency) for the running of Indonesia’s
businesses (Setyadi et al. 2009). This empirical study provides useful information to fulfill
these goals.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first large-scale, single-country
academic study that examines the degree of companies’ compliance with Indonesian
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (PSAK) disclosures that are now IFRS/
1 As of 2012, the Bapepam-LK, in its role as the supervisory body for the capital market, has been
replaced by the OJK (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan: Indonesia Financial Services Authority).
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IAS convergent. Converging to IFRS/IAS is expected to improve the quality of national
accounting standards in terms of comparability and transparency. The findings are expected
to be of particular interest to regulators and standard setters, as well as to academics who
may wish to conduct similar studies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal framework for financial
reporting. The literature review, hypothesis development, and research methodology are
described in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 6
presents conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research.
2. The Legal Framework for Financial Reporting
Indonesian Company Law No. 40 (2007) requires each company to prepare annual
reports in accordance with the accounting standards issued by the Indonesian Institute of
Accountants. However, this law has little effect on companies because no single government
agency monitors and enforces it. The Ministry of Trade (MOT), through ministerial decree
No. 121/MPP/KEP/2/2002, requires companies of certain types such as listed companies,
those that issue bonds or loan certificates, and those with total assets greater than IDR 25
billion to submit audited annual reports to the MOT, particularly to the Directorate of
Business and Regulations of the MOT. However, because there is no monitoring by a
governmental agency, law enforcement is nonexistent.
Further, the Bapepam-LK regulates companies listed in the Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI,
the Indonesian Stock Exchange), ensuring that they comply with Capital Market Law No. 8
(1995). This regulation requires listed companies to publish and submit periodic reports to
the Bapepam-LK. The reports must be audited and filed within 90 days of the calendar year
-end. Semi-annual financial statements must also be filed with the Bapepam-LK within 30
days, 60 days, or 90 days if unaudited, reviewed, or audited respectively. The Indonesian
Stock Exchange (IDX) requires interim reports to be submitted and presented on the IDX
website.
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Several studies have addressed the relationship between the level of IFRS compliance
and various corporate characteristics such as liquidity, profitability, size, industry sector,
auditor, leverage, and age (Owusu-Ansah 1998, Akhtaruddin 2005, Abdelsalam and
Weetman 2007, Aljifri 2008, Al-Shammari et al. 2008, Tsalavoutas 2011), and have
provided mixed findings. In line with prior research, this study seeks to explain the
relationship between company characteristics and the degree of companies’ compliance with
annual report disclosures in Indonesia by classifying the company-specific determinants into
internal-related and external-related variables. Internal-related variables are attributes that
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derive from and represent the internal state of companies. Size and leverage are chosen to
represent company structure, and liquidity and return on equity (ROE) to represent company
profitability. External-related variables are external company attributes that could be
important in explaining the relationship between a company’s compliance and its
regulations. The proxies are audit company and manufacturing sector.
A positive association between larger companies and disclosure practices has been
established by several studies. Companies benefit by reducing capital costs (Choi 1973,
Elliott and Jacobson 1994), supplying non-proprietary data to the public (Dye 1985, 1986,
1990), and complying with disclosure requirements (Salamon and Dhaliwal 1980: cited in
Owusu-Ansah 1998). Accordingly, Owusu-Ansah (1998) concluded that production costs are
expected to decrease as company size increases. Further, increased compliance with
regulations reduces political costs for large companies. The larger a company, the larger its
political costs will be and the greater will be the threat of adverse regulatory action (Watts
and Zimmerman 1978: cited in Craig and Diga 1998). Therefore, large companies seem
likely to respond to regulatory threats by increasing their levels of disclosure voluntarily.
It was hypothesized that companies with higher leverage were likely to disclose more
information in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry with shareholders as
well as to reassure their debt holders that their interests are protected (Abdulla 1998, Joshi
and Al-Bastaki 2000, Al-Shimmiri 2003: cited in Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Additionally,
the studies identified that such companies were likely to have less equity and riskier equity
than those with lower leverage. Consequently, shareholders demand more information in
order to assess the probability that a company is meeting its debt obligations and thereby
determine the degree of risk to future cash flows arising from the company’s investments
(Al-Mutawaa and Hewaidy 2010).
Prior studies identified that liquidity influences mandatory disclosure practices. A number
of parties such as regulatory bodies, investors, and lenders are particularly concerned with
companies’ liquidity (Wallace and Naser 1995); thus, companies with higher liquidity tend
to disclose this good news in their annual reports (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978: cited in Owusu-
Ansah 1998). However, findings about this association varied. Cooke (1989) pointed out
that companies with higher liquidity were more likely to disclose more information than
companies suffering from low liquidity. However, Wallace et al. (1994) claimed that lower
liquidity could prompt companies to increase their disclosure in order to mitigate fears and
notify shareholders that management was aware of the problem (Al-Mutawaa and Hewaidy
2010).
Companies with high profitability have greater motivation to send good news to market
than those with low profitability. However, Lang and Lundholm (1993) noted that the
influence of companies’ profitability on disclosure levels could be positive, neutral, or
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negative depending on performance. In this regard, the finding of Owusu-Ansah’s (1998)
study indicated a significant positive association while Wallace et al., (1994), Street and
Gray (2002), Glaum and Street (2003), and Ali et al. (2004) provided no evidence of an
association between profitability and disclosure levels. On the other hand, Wallace and
Naser (1995) reported a negative correlation between the two variables.
Certain types of industry could have different sensitivities to political costs than others
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Consequently, similar industries tend to release information
more freely than others in order to deal with the operating environment. However, the
empirical research regarding such issues has suggested different outcomes. In addition, Al-
Mutawaa and Hewaidy (2010) reported conflicting results regarding the association between
industry sector and disclosures. Elsewhere, Ball and Foster (1982), cited in Al-Shammari et
al. (2008), found that industry type could be a more appropriate proxy for political cost-
sensitivity than size.
The independence of auditing companies could also influence the level of compliance.
DeAngelo (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggested that big audit companies
could provide audits of higher quality than those of small audit companies because the
former are more independent. However, empirical research that tested the levels of
disclosure associated with the type of auditor contradicted this. While a number of studies
(see Street and Gray 2002, Glaum and Street 2003, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 2005) reported
a significant positive association between the type of auditor and IAS disclosure
requirements, Wallace et al. (1994) found a negative association between the type of auditor
and the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure.
Considering the above discussion, the following hypothesis is formed.
H1: There is a significant association between the levels of companies’ compliance with
IFRS-based PSAK mandatory disclosure and size, leverage, liquidity, ROE,
manufacturing sector, and auditor.
4. Research Methodology
4.1 Data Collection and Index Construction
This study aims to measure the extent to which nonfinancial listed companies comply
with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements the first time they are required to
implement the standard. Consequently, annual reports from the year ending December 31,
2012 were chosen. The data were obtained from the IDX web site. As of 2012, there were
459 issuers in the market (IDX 2012). This study eliminated some of these issuers using the
following criteria. First, financial institutions were eliminated. These institutions are
stringent about various regulations and it is assumed that they have a specific method of
financial reporting. For uniformity reasons in financial reporting, such reports were therefore
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Table 1. Summary of Sample Selection Process
Initial sample of annual reports 459
Annual reports of financial institutions (76)
Annual reports of new issuers (23)
Incomplete annual reports (7)
Final sample 353
excluded. Second, this study eliminated issuers that had been listed on the IDX for less than
a year. This is because the impact of the change on financial reporting can only be assessed
realistically after companies have been listed on the market for more than a year. Third,
issuers with incomplete reports were eliminated. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection
process.
A self-constructed disclosure checklist was developed to measure the degree of a
company’s compliance with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure. This scoring-system instrument
was constructed according to the disclosure requirements of 30 standards that were IFRS/
IAS convergent and relevant to this study (nine standards were not relevant and two
standards were not IFRS/IAS convergent). Each standard was scrutinized for mandatory
disclosure requirements. The result was 553 items on a disclosure checklist (see Table 2).
The disclosure content in each company’s annual report was then coded one (1) if it was in
the item list of the scoring system and zero (0) if it was not. If a disclosure in the list was
not applicable to the company, the item was scored as not applicable (NA). A relative score
was then computed for each company by dividing the actual score by what the company
was expected to disclose under the standards. This relative index approach has been used in
most studies regarding disclosure measurement (e.g., Owusu-Ansah 1998, Yeoh 2005,
Abdelsalam and Weetman 2007, Aljifri 2008, Al-Shammari et. al. 2008, Tsalavoutas 2011).
The disclosure index used has an unweighted scoring approach that treats all items of
information equally. A number of studies have documented this approach (e.g., Wallace
1987, Cooke 1991, 1992, Owusu-Ansah 1998, Abdelsalam and Weetman 2007, Tsalavoutas
2011). While this provides minimum subjectivity and emphasizes the extent of overall
disclosures instead of particular items (Belkaoui 1994), it faces a general problem with the
nature of scoring disclosure in annual reports; that is, whether or not an undisclosed item is
applicable to a sample company. Following Owusu-Ansah’s (1998) study, several measures
were used to deal with the problem. First, because listed companies are required by law to
disclose comparative figures for each information item, the current figures for each item
were compared with those of the prior year. Second, as suggested by Cooke (1989), the
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Table 2. IFRS-based PSAK Disclosure Checklist
No IFRS-based PSAK Items
1 Presentation of Financial Statements 92
2 Statement of Cash Flows 11
3 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 9
4 Operating Segments 31
5 Related Party Disclosures 18
6 Events after the Reporting Period 4
7 The Effects of Changes in the Foreign Exchange Rate 8
8 Interests in Joint Ventures 8
9 Investment Properties 20
10 Inventories 8
11 Investment in Associates 12
12 Property, Plant, and Equipment 15
13 Intangible Assets 14
14 Business Combinations 26
15 Revenue 3
16 Employee Benefits 18
17 Accounting, Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 16
18 Borrowing Costs 2
19 Leases 19
20 Construction Contracts 8
21 Income Taxes 15
22 Impairment of Assets 29
23 Share-Based Payment 12
24 Earnings per Share 8
25 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets 15
26 Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operation 14
27 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 101
28 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance 3
29 Insurance Contracts 11
30 Exploration and Evaluation of Mineral Resources 3
Total items 553
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entire annual report of each sample company was read twice to ensure familiarity before
scoring. In this way, the consistency of the scoring was ensured and any mistakes were
rectified before the scores were totaled.
To improve the robustness of the findings, two simultaneous unweighted methods of
compliance score, Cooke’s method (also known as the dichotomous method) and the partial
compliance (PC) method, were used (see Tsalavoutas 2011). The relative score for Cooke’s
method was computed as follows:
where DSj is the total compliance score for each company and 0<_DSj<_1. TDS is the total
number of items disclosed (di) by company j and M is the maximum number of applicable
disclosure items for company j that could have been disclosed.
The PC method was computed as follows:
where PSj (partial score) is the total compliance score for each company and 0<_PSj<_1. Xi is
the level of compliance for each mandatory disclosure that was initially calculated using the
dichotomous approach. The sum of these compliance scores (X) is divided by the total
number of relevant/applicable standards for each company j, i.e., Rj
4.2 Empirical Specification
The dependent variable of this study is the dichotomous compliance score and the
explanatory variables are continuous or categorical measurements. It is assumed that the
nature of the score could not be normally distributed. Hence, the major assumption of the
classical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, that is, that the dependent variable is
normally distributed, could be violated (Tsalavoutas 2011). Consequently, the dependent
variable is transformed to the log of the odds ratio. With regard to this concern, Cooke
(1989), cited in Tsalavoutas (2011), explained that in these types of study, “The dependent
variable is a metric ratio and therefore can be legitimately transformed, where necessary,
and used in regression analysis.” Further, he suggested that the logarithm of the odds ratio
of the dependent variable could provide the best fit. This transformation has been previously
conducted by most compliance score studies such as Al-Shiab (2003), Al-Shammari et al.
(2008), and Tsalavoutas (2011).
Following this proposition, the log of the odds ratio was then computed as follows (by
assuming that the compliance score of a company is given by p):
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where:
Y the transformed level of compliance, and
p the ratio of companies’ compliance computed with either Cooke’s method or the PC
method.
Moreover, OLS regression based on the log of the odds ratio was developed as follows:
where:
ComSco the transformed score of a company’s compliance with IFRS-based PSAK
disclosure requirements, where the score is calculated based on two methods
of disclosure index, Cooke’s and PC.
LIQU the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
LEVE the ratio of total debt to total shareholders’ equity.
SIZE the natural logarithm of total assets.
ROE the ratio of net income to average common shareholders’ equity.
AUDI audit company dummy, which equals 1 if a company is audited by a Big Four
auditor, and 0 otherwise.
MANU manufacturing sector dummy, which equals 1 if a company is in the
manufacturing sector and 0 otherwise.
For multivariate analysis, the best fitting regression model was chosen based on the
lowest mean squared error (MSE). According to Doane and Seward (2011), when Fcalc is
close to 1, the values of the mean square due to regression (MSR) and MSE are close in
magnitude, suggesting that none of the predictors provide a good predictive model for Y (i.
e., all βj are equal to 0). Moreover, when the value of MSR is much greater than MSE, this
suggests that at least one of the predictors in the regression model is significant (i.e., at least
one βj is not equal to 0). In other words, the lowest standard error is good for prediction
and otherwise the high score of standard deviation is not good for prediction. In this study,
the level of significance was set as P<0.01, and SPSS software for windows version 16.0
(SPSS Inc., IL, USA) was employed to analyze the data.
This regression, based on the log of the odds ratio, was then conducted to test the
hypothesis. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also conducted to analyze whether there
were any significant differences between the means of specific-firm characteristics in
disclosure. In addition, a paired sample t-test set as P<0.05 was conducted to compare the
means between the two compliance scores that were calculated based on Cooke’s method
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and the PC method. Before testing the hypothesis, the assumptions of the classical linear
regression model were checked with a threshold (Gujarati 2003) as follows: VIF>10 for
multicollinearity, p>0.05 for heteroskedasticity.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1 Degree of Compliance
The extent to which Indonesian listed companies complied with IFRS-based PSAK
disclosure requirements is presented in Table 3.
Panel A exhibits the values of mean and standard deviation of the two measurement
methods employed in this study. Both methods produced almost the same figures,
approximately 60 and 17% for mean and standard deviation respectively. This result was
also indicated by the paired sample t-test (p>0.05), suggesting a statistically insignificant
difference between the Cooke and PC values.
Similarly, the frequencies of the compliance scores as presented in Panel B of Table 3
supported the prior tests for both measurement methods. The first column of the table
displays the range of the scores presented as less than or equal to 49%, 50-59%, 60-69%,
70-79%, and 80-89%. Both methods showed that about 30% of the listed companies
examined comply with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements at a level less than 50%.
In addition, only 9.33% (Cooke) and 8.76% (PC) of companies complied with the
requirements at a level greater than 80%. These two company percentages were the lowest
of the analysis.
The levels of the compliance scores varied across standards. The highest levels for the
year under investigation were for PSAK 1 Presentation of Financial Statements (not
tabulated). Almost all listed companies complied with this standard at a level greater than
90%. The reason is likely to be the same as in prior studies; that is, the standard is a basic
requirement to which companies can conform relatively easily. Moreover, complying with
this standard is not associated with high proprietary costs (Al-Shammari et al. 2008,
Tsalavoutas 2011). PSAK 16 Employee Benefits and PSAK 28 Accounting for Government
Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance (not tabulated) exhibit very low average
levels of compliance. It is assumed that these two standards involve high proprietary costs;
thus, most companies tended to violate their requirements (Tsalavoutas 2011).
Several inferences can be drawn from the findings presented in Table 3. The mean values
implied that the compliance scores of Indonesian listed companies with regard to
compliance with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements are relative low. The
explanation given for the low scores confirms that law enforcement mechanisms in
Indonesia are not fully effective. Additionally, the country’s corporate governance is weak
even though it has been significantly reformed (Setyadi et al. 2009). Further, the findings
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are consistent with the argument of the World Bank (2010) that recognized Indonesia as a
civil law country with poor law enforcement and no clear bankruptcy law. They also reflect
the regulator’s lenient approach concerning compliance with IFRS-based PSAK standards
during the initial period of their implementation (Tsalavoutas 2011). In general, the findings
are in line with other studies that have investigated compliance with mandatory disclosures
in ASEAN countries (Craig and Diga 1998) and emerging capital markets such as
Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah 1998) and Bangladesh (Akhtaruddin 2005).
5.2 The Model
This section discusses the fitted regression model. As Section 4 stated, the minimization
of the MSE was chosen as the best criterion for selecting a model in this study.
Before testing the hypothesis, data were checked with regard to the assumptions of
classical linear regression. Testing for normality was conducted by using skewness and
kurtosis ratios. Multicollinearity was checked with a variance inflation factor (VIF>10) as a
threshold (Gujarati 2003: 262) and the VIF values were reported for each regression.
Moreover, heteroskedasticity was checked by a Glejser test. Outliers were defined and
excluded by using Cook’s distance as a measure (Fielding and Gilbert 2004, Pallant 2005).
As presented in Table 4, the findings show that the data are free from these problems.
Table 4 also presents summary outputs of the compliance scores calculated by Cooke’s
method and the PC method. Several inferences can be drawn from Table 4. First, the
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Disclosure Scores
A. Disclosure Scores
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
Cooke’s Method 353 0.213 0.895 0.593 0.175
PC Method 353 0.191 0.898 0.596 0.176
Paired sample t-test -1.628 (p>0.05)
B. Distribution of Disclosure Scores
Compliance Scores Cooke’s Method  PC Method 
<_0.49 106 29.94 106 29.94
0.50 − 0.59 52 14.97 50 14.41
0.60 − 0.69 72 20.34 77 21.75
0.70 − 0.79 90 25.42 89 25.14
0.80 − 0.89 33 9.33 31 8.76
N 353 100 353 100
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multiple R column shows an average simultaneous linear regression between dependent and
independent variables constituting 66% for Cooke’s method and 64% for the PC method.
Second, the coefficient determination (R2) is about 40% for both methods indicating that
40% of the variation in the compliance scores is explained by the six predictors employed
in this study. Further, the remaining prediction could be explained by external factors that
are not included in the regression model. The slight gap between R2 and adjusted R2
suggests that there are one or more weak predictors in the model (Doane and Seward 2011).
A comparison between standard error and standard deviation values shows that the former is
less than the latter, meaning that the regression model is better at predicting the compliance
scores.
Additional information that can be drawn from Table 4 concerns analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Cooke’s method and the PC method show large F-value results accompanying
small p-values (<0.05). This indicates that the predictors are simultaneously significant for
the prediction of the levels of companies’ compliance with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure
requirements.
The sign of the correlation coefficient, according to Cooke’s method, shows that the
predictors, company size, liquidity, and audit company, had a positive association with
compliance scores, while leverage, ROE, and manufacturing sector show contrasting results.
Table 4 The Findings of Multivariate Analyses
Cooke PC
Model VIF Model VIF
Constant -0.697 -0.628
SIZE 0.045 1.179 0.043 1.179
LEVE -0.001 1.077 -0.001 1.077
LIQU 0.000 1.023 -8.587E-5 1.023
ROE -0.016 1.075 -0.022 1.075
MANU -0.053 1.018 -0.052 1.018
AUDI 0.106 1.184 0.112 1.184
F 43.740 40.930
R2 0.431 0.415
Adj. R2 0.421 0.405
MSE 0.133 0.136
Skewness -1.19 -1.89
Kurtosis 0 0.09
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This means that an increase in score is consistent with an increase in company size and
liquidity as well as the use of Big Four auditors. Further, the decrease in leverage and ROE
has encouraged companies to increase their disclosure requirements. In addition, it seems
that the type of industry did not have a direct association with the levels of companies’
compliance with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements in the first year of
implementation, 2012. In contrast, liquidity shows a negative association with the PC
method, which suggests that this predictor had no direct association with the levels of
companies’ compliance.
5.3 Evidence from Indonesian Listed Companies
This section discusses the main empirical results obtained from testing whether the
degree of company compliance with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements had been
influenced by firm characteristics.
The figures presented in Table 4 (the column model) explain factors that influence the
levels of companies’ compliance with the disclosure required by IFRS-based PSAK. Both
methods show that predictor size, audit company, and manufacturing sector (p-values are
lower than 5%) had a significant influence. In contrast, predictor liquidity and ROE
insignificantly affected the degree of companies’ compliance with disclosure requirements (p
-values are higher than 5%).
As predicted, the effect of company size on disclosure level confirms the hypothesized
positive association between size and levels of mandatory disclosure. This indicates that
company size is statistically significant, at a 0.05 level, to the extent of mandatory
disclosure by the sample of listed companies in their annual reports. Further, the positive
sign on the coefficient suggests that size had a direct influence on the level of companies’
disclosure in Indonesia. This finding confirms the results reported by the majority of prior
research; for example, Wallace and Naser (1995), Craig and Diga (1998), Owusu-Ansah
(1998), Aljifri (2008), Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Setyadi et
al. (2009) and Al-Mutawaa and Hewaidy (2010).
Similarly, the regression model on companies with Big Four auditors exhibits positive
signs and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The finding confirms the hypothesized
positive association between audit companies and the level of mandatory disclosure. This
strong evidence is consistent with Tsalavoutas’s (2011) study, which stated that companies
with Big Four auditors generally comply with IFRS mandatory disclosure. In the context of
Greece, Tsalavoutas (2011) correlated the finding with prior evidence that higher earnings
management and lower audit effort is common among companies with small auditors.
The explanation of the findings for Indonesia should be correlated with capital needs
theory. Such theory posits that a primary motivation for companies to increase disclosure is
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the need to raise capital (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003). Managers could perceive that
higher levels of financial disclosure lead to lower costs for new capital because such
disclosure reduces information asymmetries (Choi 1973, Firth 1980, Cooke, 1993).
After experiencing the severe Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Indonesia saw a
significant increase in the role of the capital market as an alternative source of long-term
financing for business entities (Rosul 2002). Listed companies now compete with each other
in order to attract financing from domestic or overseas investors by disclosing more
information regarding risk and future prospects. According to Hope (2003), the level of
mandatory disclosure detail can provide insights for assessing a company’s sustainability of
earnings and can help financial analysts. In this regard, disclosing information that is
required by IFRS mandated disclosure could provide investors with the information they
seek.
The finding about the effect of the size variable on corporate disclosure levels is also
similar to most findings uncovered by prior studies, which are mainly concerned with cost-
based theories related to information and political costs. For instance, larger companies that
provide more information reduce production costs (Owusu-Ansah 1998), lower the cost of
disclosure (Ho and Wong 2001), and cut the competitive cost of disclosure by meeting the
increased demand for reducing uncertainty about quality and expected returns (Ferguson et
al. 2002). In addition, Craig and Diga (1998) argued that size could be a proxy for the
breadth and complexity of company operations in one country and for political cost in
another.
Further, large corporate clients, because of their size and complexity, tend to employ
large auditors that have established themselves over time with the necessary technical base
and expertise in order to fulfill client needs. Large companies face expensive punitive
measures if they violate stock exchange listing requirements and the demands of trustee
monitoring through inadvertent non-compliance with statutory disclosures. In addition, many
international conglomerates face mandatory disclosure requirements, which change over
time, country by country. In order to minimize the risk of non-compliance with such
changes, it is incumbent on these large companies to employ the resources of international
auditors, which are by their nature the larger audit companies. Therefore, it is not surprising
that an association exists between large auditors and higher statutory disclosure levels
(Ahmed and Courtis 1999).
Additionally, considering the particular context of Indonesia, agency propositions and
signaling theories provide the basis for interpreting the finding about the association
between audit companies and higher mandatory disclosure levels. Implementing IFRS-based
PSAK for the first time is challenging. This practice is complex, and the lack of qualified
professionals among accountants in Indonesia could hinder transparency and the need for
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better quality financial reporting (Worldbank 2010). International auditors are likely to have
greater competence and expertise about the IFRS in addition to well-established reputations
(Dumontier and Raffournier 1998), whereas small audit companies could lack the
combination of qualified personnel and internal controls needed to ensure compliance
(Ettredge et al. 2011). Therefore, hiring the Big Four auditors could reduce errors or
misrepresentations in corporate reports (DeAngelo 1981), act as a monitoring mechanism,
and satisfy the aforementioned needs. Consequently, agency costs fall and levels of
compliance rise, and clients can attract more outside investors (Tsalavoutas 2011).
This study found that variable profitability measured as ROE is not significant; therefore,
the hypothesis is not supported. This implies that more companies that are profitable do not
disclose significantly more mandatory information than less profitable ones. Such evidence
is in line with some prior studies (Wallace and Naser 1995, Aljifri 2008, Hossain and
Hammami 2009). Other studies (Owusu-Ansah 1998, Leuz 2003, Al-Shammari, Brown, and
Tarca 2008, Li and Harrison 2008) show a positive influence. The negative effect of
profitability on disclosure levels provides some weak support for the signaling hypothesis,
which posits that superior and profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information
for investors. Annual reports, however, are not the only means of communicating
information. Other sources are employed by companies to convey good news (Ahmed and
Courtis 1999).
Table 4 shows that liquidity has no correlation with the degree of companies’ compliance
with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements. The irrelevance of liquidity as an
explanatory variable in Indonesia agrees with the findings of Wallace and Naser’s (1995)
and Owusu-Ansah’s (1998) studies in Hong Kong and Zimbabwe respectively. They argued
that a company with a lower liquidity ratio has a greater need to allay the information
asymmetry concerns of investors and lenders by providing enhanced disclosure. However,
this does not seem to apply to Indonesian-listed companies for which liquidity is not
correlated with disclosure requirements. Although a significant finding was expected, this is
consistent with the findings of some prior studies (Wallace and Nasser 1995, Owusu-Ansah
and Yeoh 2005, Al-Shammari et al. 2008) and could indicate that companies with lower
liquidity find other means to communicate their financial soundness.
6. Conclusions, Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research
The purpose of the present study is to examine the extent to which Indonesian listed
companies comply with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure requirements and to investigate the
factors that influence disclosure practices. The findings show that Indonesian listed
companies had a low average level of compliance with IFRS-based PSAK requirements in
2012. This compliance was approximately 60% of the items in the index, measured by
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using Cooke’s method and the PC method. This result is consistent with prior studies that
investigated compliance with mandatory disclosures in ASEAN countries (Craig and Diga
1998) and emerging capital markets such as Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah 1998) and
Bangladesh (Akhtaruddin 2005).
It seems that the low compliance score for the Indonesian context is consistent with the
evidence that law enforcement mechanisms in the country are not fully effective and are
accompanied by weak corporate governance (Setyadi et al. 2009). In addition, the finding is
consistent with the argument of the World Bank (2005), which recognized Indonesia as a
civil law country with poor law enforcement and no clear bankruptcy law. It also reflects
the regulator’s lenient approach concerning compliance with IFRS-based PSAK during the
initial period of the standards’ implementation.
Further, regression analysis to investigate the factors that influence compliance levels
illustrates that companies were more compliant with IFRS-based PSAK disclosure
requirements in 2012 when they had the following characteristics: they were large,
employed Big Four auditors, and were in the manufacturing industry. For Indonesia, the
findings should be correlated with capital needs theory, which posits that a primary
motivation for companies to increase disclosure is the need to raise capital. In order to
attract more financing from investors, large companies enhance mandatory disclosure.
Moreover, because the implementation of IFRS-based PSAK is complex, and there is a
shortage of qualified professionals who are familiar with the new standards, most companies
hire Big Four auditors. Such auditors are more likely to have IFRS competency and
experience.
A single year investigation is the main shortcoming of this study. Understanding the
nature of overall disclosure is needed in order to undertake a study using more than two
years’ data for comparative purposes. Further, this research is limited to nonfinancial listed
companies; therefore, future research could investigate other industries because they are
likely to have more stringent financial reporting regulations.
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